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KEYNOTE: 
MOTIVATING PRIVATE CLIMATE GOVERNANCE: 
THE ROLE OF THE EFFICIENCY GAP 
Michael P. Vandenbergh* 
The topic of this symposium, “Environmental 
Sustainability and Private Governance,” is important and timely.  
In response to the shrinking federal role in environmental 
protection, many policy advocates have focused on the role of 
states and cities, but this symposium focuses on another 
important source of sustainability initiatives:  the private sector, 
including corporations, households, civic and cultural 
organizations, religious organizations, private hospitals, colleges 
and universities, and other organizations.  States, cities, and 
other subnational government responses are increasingly 
important, but the limited geographic reach of subnational 
governments constrains their ability to address many 
environmental problems.  For instance, although twenty states 
have set quantified greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions targets and 
are adopting policies to reduce emissions, almost two-thirds of 
United States GHG emissions arise from the thirty states that do 
not have GHG targets.1  Private governance initiatives offer an 
opportunity to fill the gap.2 
I.  THE PRIVATE GOVERNANCE RESPONSE TO 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
* David Daniels Allen Distinguished Chair of Law, Director, Climate Change Research
Network, and Co-Director, Energy, Environment and Land Use Program, Vanderbilt 
University Law School.  Many thanks to Sara Rollet Gosman and the student editors of the 
Arkansas Law Review for organizing the 2017 Environmental Sustainability and Private 
Governance Symposium. Claudia Stantzyk-Guzek and Isaac Gabella provided valuable 
research assistance.   
1. Rocky Mountain Institute, Mapping Non-Federal Action on Climate Change:
High-Level Survey of State, City and Corporate Commitments 3 (June 9, 2017).  
2. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL 
L. REV. 129, 141-47 (2013) (defining “private environmental governance” and related 
terms). 
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Understanding the role of the private sector is thus essential 
to exploiting the full range of options for achieving 
sustainability.  In a new book, physicist Jonathan Gilligan and I 
address the role that the private sector can play in responding to 
climate change, which we view as the principal threat to 
sustainability.3  We make two core arguments. 
First, we show why efforts to mobilize support for climate 
mitigation by reframing the threat posed by climate change are 
falling short.4  In our view, much of the current climate 
skepticism and opposition to government climate mitigation has 
little to do with the certainty or severity of the problem, and 
recent efforts to reframe the problem to emphasize different 
aspects of the threat have barely moved the dial on support for 
government-mitigation measures.5  Whether the new framing 
emphasizes the severity of heat waves and other near-term 
effects, the importance of sea-level rise and other long-term 
effects, implications for social justice, or other aspects of the 
climate problem, efforts to emphasize different aspects of the 
climate threat have not produced a major shift in support for 
mitigation in the United States over the last two decades. 
We argue for a new approach to framing that is grounded in 
the idea that beliefs about the climate problem are strongly 
influenced by concerns about the anticipated response to the 
problem.6  Recent polling shows that between two-thirds and 
three-quarters of the U.S. population believe that big 
government is the biggest problem we face.7  If this large 
segment of the U.S. population also equates climate mitigation 
with big government, which it likely does, we should not be 
surprised that many people engage in confirmation bias and 
3. See generally MICHAEL P. VANDENBERGH & JONATHAN M. GILLIGAN, BEYOND
POLITICS: THE PRIVATE GOVERNANCE RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE (2017). 
4. Id. at Preface, Ch. 1, Ch. 7.
5. Id. 
6. See id. at i-ii.  Psychologists have described a related phenomenon as “solution 
aversion.”  See Troy H. Campbell & Aaron C. Kay, Solution Aversion: On the Relation 
Between Ideology and Motivated Disbelief, 107 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 809, 
809 (2014) (introducing and discussing “solution aversion”); see also Andrew C. Revkin, 
How ‘Solution Aversion’ and Global Warming Prescriptions Polarize the Climate Debate, 
N.Y. TIMES: DOT EARTH (Nov. 10, 2014, 4:01 PM), https:// dotearth. blogs. nytimes. 
com/2014/11/10/how-solution-aversion-and-global-warming-prescriptions-polarize-the-
climate-debate/ [https://perma.cc/DSM7-ZRCH].  
7. See VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 3, at i.
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motivated reasoning, tossing out climate-science information 
that is inconsistent with their worldview and rejecting 
government climate-mitigation measures.  In short, our first 
point is that when seeking to understand belief in climate 
science and support for climate mitigation, the framing of how 
we can respond to climate change is as important as the framing 
of the problem itself.  This conclusion, in turn, suggests that the 
subject of this symposium— private responses to climate 
change—may provide a way to bypass worldview-based 
concerns. In turn, this approach may garner more widespread 
support for climate mitigation among conservatives and 
libertarians than an exclusive focus on government action, 
whether federal, state, or local. 
Second, we argue that the private sector can provide 
meaningful levels of emissions reductions:  Private initiatives 
can reduce global carbon emissions by a billion tons per year 
over the next decade.8  The billion-ton annual total includes 
roughly half- a-billion tons of reductions from the corporate 
sector and half-a- billion tons from the household sector.9  
Although the other private actors mentioned above (e.g., 
religious organizations, universities, and civic and cultural 
organizations) can also make major reductions, to simplify the 
analysis we have not included reductions from other private 
actors in our billion-ton total. 
An example of a private initiative that has already reduced 
GHG emissions is the effort by CDP (formerly the Carbon 
Disclosure Project) to push for carbon disclosure from major 
corporations by leveraging the interest in GHG emissions 
reductions by global investors with more than $100 trillion in 
investments.10 CDP’s initiatives increase the pressure on major 
corporations to disclose and reduce emissions, and, although it is 
difficult to demonstrate causation, CDP has argued that 
participating companies have reduced emissions by hundreds of 
millions of tons.  This symposium is being conducted near 
Bentonville, Arkansas, so it is also appropriate to mention 
Walmart’s 2010 announcement that it would work with the 
8. See id. at Ch. 1.
9. Id. 
10. See id. at Ch. 5 (identifying initiatives that target corporate GHG emissions).
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Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) to reduce 20 million metric 
tons of GHGs from its supply chain, an effort that resulted in a 
28.2 million ton reduction.11  More recently, Walmart made a 
commitment, working with EDF and the World Wildlife Fund, 
to achieve a billion tons of emissions reductions from its supply 
chain by 2030.12  Although private initiatives that target 
households have achieved less notoriety than those that target 
corporations, these initiatives have included efforts to increase 
the uptake of efficient LED lightbulbs, efforts to reduce 
electricity demand through providing comparative information 
about electricity use in monthly power bills, efforts by 
companies to increase employees’ household energy efficiency, 
and others.13  According to a recent study by several economists, 
in the last several years the U.S. household sector has reduced 
electricity use for the first time since World War II, and the 
efficiencies from increased uptake of LED lightbulbs alone are 
great enough to explain this major shift in household electricity 
use.14 
The billion tons of annual GHG reductions that can be 
achieved through private initiatives will not solve the climate 
problem or displace the need for a strong government response, 
but these reductions are roughly equal to eliminating all of the 
emissions of any one of the top ten emitting countries other than 
China and the United States.  Reductions of this magnitude will 
buy time, reduce the cost and intrusiveness of more 
comprehensive government climate-mitigation laws and 
policies, and reduce the risk that the planet will pass tipping 
points in the interim.  If properly selected and implemented, 
private initiatives also can facilitate rather than undermine 
support for federal, state, and local efforts. 
11. See Walmart Marks Fulfillment of Key Global Responsibility Commitments,
WALMART (Nov. 17, 2015), https:// news.walmart.com/ news-archive/ 2015/ 11/ 17/ 
walmart- marks- fulfillment- of- key- global- responsibility- commitments 
[https://perma.cc/NF64-432H].  
12. See Walmart Launches Project Gigaton to Reduce Emissions in Company’s
Supply Chain, WALMART (Apr. 19, 2017), https://news.walmart.com/ 2017/ 04/ 19/ 
walmart-launches-project-gigaton-to-reduce-emissions-in-companys-supply-chain 
[https://perma.cc/APH7-GKHV].  
13. See VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 3, at Ch. 6 (identifying initiatives
that target household GHG emissions). 
14. See Lucas W. Davis, Evidence of a Decline in Electricity Use by U.S. 
Households, 37 ECON. BULL. 1098, 1098, 1100-01 (2017). 
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II. THE EFFICIENCY GAP: PERSPECTIVES FROM
ENGINEERING AND ECONOMICS 
Although the private response to climate change can 
provide a way to bypass the political gridlock on the climate 
issue, the emergence of private governance raises questions 
about the relationship between private action and public action, 
the extent to which private action yields genuine emissions 
reductions as opposed to greenwashing, and the distributional 
justice issues arising from private climate initiatives. My focus 
here, though, is on why it is plausible to argue that private actors 
can be induced to make major emissions reductions.  Private 
advocacy groups and other private organizations lack the 
coercive power and resources available to governments, so why 
is it plausible to assume that major emissions reductions can be 
achieved from the private sector in the absence of government 
action?  What types of motivation can private climate initiatives 
create or rely on induce large-scale emissions reductions from 
private actors? 
One part of the answer is that private initiatives can induce 
carbon-emissions reductions by closing the energy-efficiency 
gap.  For my purposes here, the energy-efficiency gap is the 
difference between the energy-efficiency measures that 
corporations and households could take at negative cost and the 
measures that they have actually taken to date.15  Although 
anthropogenic GHG emissions occur from non-energy-related 
activities (e.g., use of nitrogen-containing fertilizers and 
refrigerants), the vast majority of GHG emissions are the result 
of fossil-fuel-based energy use, so reductions in energy use tend 
to correspond to reductions in GHG emissions. 
If many situations exist in which corporations and 
households can profit by reducing energy use, private initiatives 
that target corporations and households should not need the 
coercive power or resources of government to induce them to act 
or to accelerate the speed with which they act.  Instead, they 
15. In their 2012 article, Allcott and Greenstone define the Energy Efficiency Gap
as the “wedge between the cost-minimizing level of energy efficiency and the level 
actually realized.” Hunt Allcott & Michael Greenstone, “Is There an Energy Efficiency 
Gap”, 26 J.  ECON. PERSP. 3, 4 (2012). 
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simply need to address the reasons why those efficiencies have 
not already been achieved.  This may be no small task, and self-
interest is not the only motivation for households and 
corporations, but it is far easier to harness self-interest than to 
work against it.  A large efficiency gap thus makes it more likely 
that private initiatives could yield substantial reductions in 
carbon emissions even absent government action.  These 
initiatives may induce additional efficiency steps by providing 
information about the efficiency opportunity, overcoming 
behavioral failures, better aligning incentives between principals 
and agents, or otherwise overcoming barriers to actions that are 
in the target’s interest.  At the same time, if the efficiency gap is 
small, the opportunity for private initiatives is also small.  
Motivations other than financial gains can drive GHG emissions 
reductions by corporations and households even absent a large 
efficiency gap (e.g., reputation, employee recruitment and 
morale, investor and lender pressure, anticipation of future 
regulations, and social and personal norms),16 but the magnitude 
of the private opportunity is reduced if the efficiency gap is 
small.  I focus here on corporations and households, but the 
efficiency gap is also important for other private sector actors, 
and for states, cities, and other public-sector energy users as 
well. 
The efficiency gap is thus an alluring idea because it maps 
out the path to an environmental and economic win-win that can 
increase the size of the private climate-governance opportunity.  
The efficiency gap could exist because private actors fail to 
account for some of the social costs of energy use (often referred 
to as energy use externalities, such as the climate harms from 
carbon emissions associated with energy use) or because private 
actors fail to make investments in energy efficiency that are 
profitable to them (often referred to as investment 
inefficiencies).17 Energy use externalities (e.g., the harms of 
climate change not accounted for when GHGs are emitted) are 
important for those who design private initiatives, since better 
understanding where energy use externalities exist may help 
private policymakers direct private initiatives toward areas that 
16. Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Drivers of Corporate Climate Mitigation, ENVTL.
F., Jan.-Feb. 2018, at 29, 29. 
17. Allcott & Greenstone, supra note 15, at 4.
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are important for climate mitigation.  In addition, corporate 
managers’ and households’ concerns about social benefits (such 
as reducing the climate effects of GHG emissions) may motivate 
some behavior change, but social benefits typically will be less 
likely to motivate behavior change than more direct corporate or 
personal benefits.  I focus on investment efficiencies here 
because my focus is on the extent to which direct energy savings 
can be achieved by corporations and households.  
Uncertainty about the efficiency gap exists in large part 
because engineers and economists take different approaches to 
assessing the size of the gap and arrive at very different 
conclusions, yet they rarely engage with one another.  As a 
result, limited work has been done to bridge the disciplinary 
differences and to understand which aspects of each camp’s 
approach provide the most accurate view of the size and 
composition of the gap, what types of initiatives are most 
promising, and how much effort should be directed toward 
efficiency-based initiatives as opposed to other climate 
measures.  The first camp, which is made up principally of 
engineers, often adopts a social perspective (including energy 
use externalities in the analysis) and leverages the existence of 
available energy-efficient measures to argue that a substantial, 
actionable gap exists.  The leading study that takes an 
engineering perspective is the 2009 McKinsey & Co. report 
Unlocking Energy Efficiency in the U.S. Economy.18  The aim of 
the report is to determine the social potential for cost-effective 
energy savings that would result if firms and households were to 
invest in available, energy-efficient technology.  In this 
approach, investments are optimal if benefits exceed costs, 
regardless of who bears the investment costs and to whom 
savings accrue. The value of investments are quantified using 
net present value (NPV) calculations.  The NPV of an 
investment equals the present, or discounted, value of energy 
savings subtracted from the costs of investment, installation and 
18. See HANNAH CHOI GRANADE ET AL., MCKINSEY & CO., UNLOCKING ENERGY
EFFICIENCY IN THE U.S. ECONOMY (2009), https:// www.sallan.org/ pdf-docs/ 
MCKINSEY_ US_ energy_ efficiency.pdf [https://perma.cc/WW67-G4RX].   
356 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 71:2 
operation costs for example.19  The inherent uncertainty of the 
future parameters is accounted for by modeling potential 
investments against a variety of parameter sets.20 The 2009 
McKinsey & Co. study considered 675 investment opportunities 
in the United States across a 10-year period from 2010-2020. 
The report’s preferred model found the potential to reduce 
annual energy consumption by approximately 23% of projected 
demand in 2020 while saving $130 billion (2009 value).21  A 
number of other engineering studies have reached similar 
conclusions.22 
Many of these studies suggest that large inefficiencies 
exist, but their value for our analysis here is limited to the extent 
they focus on the net social savings (including both energy use 
externalities and investment inefficiencies), not the savings to 
the companies or households that would be the targets of these 
kinds of initiatives (including only investment inefficiencies).  
19. Id. at v.  Discounting future values⎯be they costs or savings⎯requires
estimating a set of future parameters, including energy prices, carbon taxes, interest rates 
and technological learning rates. 
20. Id. at xii.  For other studies, see, e.g., MCKINSEY & CO., PATHWAYS TO A LOW-
CARBON ECONOMY: VERSION 2 OF THE GLOBAL GREENHOUSE GAS ABATEMENT COST 
CURVE (2009), https:// www.mckinsey.com/ ~/ media/ mckinsey/ dotcom/client_service 
/sustainability/ cost%20curve% 20pdfs/ pathways_lowcarbon_economy_version2.ashx 
[https://perma.cc/4LFL-JAGZ]; STEVEN NADEL & THERESE LANGER, COMMENTS ON “IS 
THERE AN ENERGY EFFICIENCY GAP?” (2012), http://aceee.org/files/pdf/white-
paper/comments-on-is-there-an-energy-efficiency-gap.pdf [https://perma.cc/2E73-5YS8]; 
NAT’L ACTION PLAN FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY, ENERGY EFFICIENCY AS A LOW-COST 
RESOURCE FOR ACHIEVING CARBON EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS §§ 4-1 to 4-3 (2009), https:// 
www.epa.gov/ sites/ production/ files/ 2015-08/ documents/ ee_ and_ carbon.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/G264-LLKK]; DAN YORK ET AL., NEW HORIZONS FOR ENERGY 
EFFICIENCY:MAJOR OPPORTUNITIES TO REACH HIGHER ELECTRICITY SAVINGS BY 2030 
(2015), http:// aceee.org/ research- report/u1507 [https://perma.cc/739T-RQB5]; Andy 
Gouldson et al., Accelerating Low-Carbon Development in the World’s Cities (Sept. 2015) 
(working paper), http:// newclimateeconomy.report/ 2015/ wp-content/ uploads/ sites/ 
3/2015/09/NCE2015_workingpaper_cities_final_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/VHA8-RJAB]. 
21. GRANADE ET AL., supra note 18, at 7-8. 
22. See, e.g., WORLD WILDLIFE FUND & CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT, THE 3%
SOLUTION: DRIVING PROFITS THROUGH CARBON REDUCTION 6 (2013), 
https://c402277.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/publications/575/files/original/The_3_Percent_Solutio
n_-_June_10.pdf [https://perma.cc/UX3M-F5J7] (noting the potential for private sector 
action to reduce global carbon emissions by 3% per year).  A 2015 study by York et al., 
supra note 20, examined the potential for reducing electricity use in the United States 
between 2015 and 2030.  Profiling 18 market ready measures, the study estimated that their 
use would reduce electricity consumption by 22% in 2030.  Id. at 9.  Most measures would 
cost less per kWh-of-saved-energy than it would take to supply the same amount by 
building new natural-gas-fired plants.  Id. at vi-vii. 
2018 MOTIVATING CLIMATE GOVERNANCE 357 
In other words, they address whether it would be in the interest 
of society generally, not in the specific interest of the targeted 
corporations or households, for these actions to be taken.23  
Nevertheless, the large size of the gap identified by these studies 
and the large contribution of investment inefficiencies to the 
analysis24 suggests that even if these studies include energy use 
externalities and are somewhat optimistic, a substantial energy-
efficiency gap may exist based only on investment 
inefficiencies. 
The second camp, which is made up principally of 
economists, often focuses on the extent to which an efficiency 
gap exists based on investment inefficiencies rather than energy-
use externalities.  By drawing attention to the private investment 
decisions faced by firms and households, economists shed light 
on the opportunity for win-win behavior changes and clarify the 
barriers to socially-preferred investments in energy efficiency 
that engineers may overlook.  The studies that emerge from this 
camp begin with the assumption that private actors typically 
behave rationally and function in markets that are generally 
efficient, and they look for departures from these assumptions 
that might support an efficiency gap.  These studies also tend to 
be critical of much of the methodology of energy efficiency 
research and are skeptical about efficiency-gap claims, pointing 
to empirical studies that suggest that claimed efficiencies are 
often not achieved in practice.  An example is a 2004 study by 
two leading economists who examined Department of Energy 
(DOE) audits of small to midsize firms and found that over half 
of “engineering approved investments” were rejected because of 
unaccounted-for costs.25 
Although economists are skeptical about many energy-
efficiency-gap claims, they acknowledge that a gap can result 
23. A 2015 working paper from New Climate Economy considered investment
opportunities in the world’s cities across three sectors; buildings, transport, and waste. 
Gouldson et al., supra note 20.  The authors’ preferred model found room for reducing 3.7 
Gt CO2e by 2030 (carbon dioxide equivalent) at a net savings of $16.2 trillion (2015 value) 
through 2015-2050.  Id. at 16-17.   
24. An example of an action that has both energy use externalities and investment
inefficiencies is the federal fuel economy standards.  As Nadel and Langer note, investment 
inefficiency accounts for most of the inefficiency addressed by these fuel economy 
standards.  See NADEL & LANGER, supra note 20, at 4. 
25. Anderson & Newell (2004).
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from market failures.  Three forms of failure receive substantial 
attention in the literature: imperfect information, split incentives, 
and liquidity constraints and credit rationing. Imperfect 
information exists when firms and households are unaware of 
(or unable to verify) existing energy-efficient investments.26  
Split incentives exist when the agent responsible for making 
investment decisions is not the one who will recoup the 
benefits.27  One important instance of market failure, principal-
agent (PA) problems, arises from a combination of these effects.  
For instance, two parties may contract in conditions of both 
imperfect information and split incentives if one party (the 
principal) has insufficient information to hold the second party 
(the agent) accountable to the former’s preferences.28  Finally, 
liquidity constraints and credit rationing exist when agents, 
having insufficient funds and limited access to credit, are unable 
to afford the upfront costs of otherwise attractive investments.  
An example would be a household that lacks the capital or 
access to a lender to enable the purchase of a new heating and 
cooling system, even if the lower energy costs of the system 
would allow the household to recoup the initial investment 
within several years.  Although studies by economists have 
identified reasons why investment inefficiencies might occur 
and have generated empirical data to support the existence of 
investment inefficiencies, on balance the literature emerging 
from this camp casts doubt on the existence of a large efficiency 
gap and does not attempt to quantify the size of the gap that it 
believes does exist. 
Although engineers and economists rarely engage directly 
with one another in the literature, a 2012 exchange between 
leading economists and efficiency advocates provides a valuable 
example of the differences of opinion on the efficiency gap.  The 
26. Steve Sorrell et al., Barriers to Industrial Energy Efficiency: A Literature
Review 6 tbl.2.3 (U.N. Indus. Dev. Org., Working Paper No. 10/2011, 2011), 
https://open.unido.org/api/documents/4817768/download/Barriers%20to%20industrial%20
energy%20efficiency%20-%20A%20literature%20review [https://perma.cc/J7YK-EWE4]. 
27. Id. 
28. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, MIND THE GAP: QUANTIFYING PRINCIPAL-AGENT
PROBLEMS IN ENERGY EFFICIENCY 27 (2007), https:// www.iea.org/ publications/ 
freepublications/ publication/ mind_the_gap.pdf [https://perma.cc/ST7L-CCUH]. 
Principal-Agent problems in energy efficiency are often discussed under the heading of 
landlord-tenant problems. 
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exchange began with a paper in the Journal of Economic 
Perspectives by economists Hunt Allcott and Michael 
Greenstone, which concluded that “while investment 
inefficiencies do appear in various settings, the actual magnitude 
of the Energy Efficiency Gap is small relative to the assessments 
from engineering analyses.”29  The paper did not provide an 
estimate of the gap, but it suggested that many empirical studies 
of investment inefficiencies were flawed for several reasons, 
including that many of the studies did not involve rigorous 
methodological design.  Moreover, even where the energy cost 
savings were clear the energy-efficiency investments were often 
subject to “other unobserved costs and benefits” that were not 
accounted for in the study.30 
Allcott and Greenstone concluded that engineering studies 
thus may identify as investment inefficiencies decisions that are 
actually rational responses to hidden costs and risk.  These 
hidden or unobserved costs include costs that are visible to the 
household or firm but are not accounted for by the studies.  One 
instance of an important unobserved cost for households is the 
difference in quality between energy-efficient and inefficient 
goods, such as the comparatively harsh glow of fluorescent 
lights as compared to incandescent ones.  A form of unobserved 
cost that may be particularly important to corporations is the 
adoption cost associated with the search for and implementation 
of energy efficient technology (e.g., disruptions to production, 
staff replacement and training, etc.).31  In addition, risk occurs 
when a choice could have multiple outcomes.  The riskier the 
investment, the more improbable the desired returns and the 
larger the likelihood these investments will be discounted by a 
rational agent.32 
Although Allcott and Greenstone acknowledge that 
consumers often lack information about energy use and that 
investment inefficiencies occur, they conclude that “the 
empirical magnitudes of the investment inefficiencies appear to 
29. Allcott & Greenstone, supra note 15, at 25.
30. Id. at 5.
31. See Sorrell et al., supra note 26, at 6 tbl.2.3.
32. See Florian Knobloch & Jean-Francois Mercure, “The Behavioral Aspect of
Green Technology Investments: A General Positive Model in the Context of Heterogeneous 
Agents,”  21 ENVTL. INNOVATION & SOCIETAL TRANSITIONS 39, 42 tbl.1 (2016).  
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be smaller, indeed substantially smaller, than the massive 
potential savings calculated in engineering analyses such as 
McKinsey & Co. (2009).”33  In addition, given the heterogeneity 
of consumer investment inefficiencies, they point out that many 
broad energy-efficiency laws and policies (e.g., federal 
appliance-efficiency standards) will benefit the consumers 
subject to inefficiencies, but not those consumers that are not 
subject to inefficiencies, suggesting that these measures should 
be tailored to affect those consumers most subject to the 
investment inefficiencies.34 Unfortunately, this kind of tailoring 
can be a difficult task for policymakers. 
A public or private policymaker might well conclude, based 
on the Allcott and Greenstone critique, that initiatives targeting 
the energy-efficiency gap are far less promising than the 
engineering studies would suggest and are not worth a major 
investment.  In a departure from the stove-piped dialogue on 
efficiency, though, energy-efficiency advocates Steven Nadel 
and Therese Langer of the American Council for an Energy 
Efficient Economy (ACEEE) responded quickly with a critique 
of the Allcott and Greenstone study.35  Nadel and Langer do not 
pull any punches. They accuse the economists of being 
“misleading” and suggest that the authors “selectively mine 
available data to make their points, often ignoring other findings 
in the various articles they cite.”36  For instance, they argue that 
Allcott and Greenstone often use only the high-discount-rate 
scenarios from the papers they review, emphasize the existence 
of high imputed discount rates by retail consumers, and fail to 
cite studies that suggest a lower discount rate.37  A high discount 
rate will tend to reduce the value of the efficiency gains, which 
often occur over years or decades, and decrease the size of the 
efficiency gap. Nadel and Langer identify weatherization and 
utility demand-side management programs (such as programs to 
increase the efficient use of electricity in households) as areas 
that yield larger savings when the analysis uses discount rates 
that are more realistic in their view. 
33. Allcott & Greenstone, supra note 15, at 5 (citation omitted).
34. Id. 
35. See NADEL & LANGER, supra note 20, at 1. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 2-4.
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Nadel and Langer also critique other aspects of the 
economists’ analysis, including the treatment of split incentives 
between landlords and tenants, conclusions about consumers’ 
lack of information regarding appliance energy use, and others.  
For instance, as to the efficiency gap regarding motor-vehicle 
fuel economy in the U.S., they take issue with the economists’ 
assumptions about the extent to which federal policies are 
defensible based on investment inefficiencies, how consumers 
value the cost savings from fuel efficiency and the extent to 
which government efficiency standards push the development of 
new technologies, inducing automakers to develop and supply 
consumers with more efficient vehicles.  They also claim that 
the Allcott and Greenstone critique of government energy-
efficiency incentives and standards may be valid in perfectly 
functioning markets, “but perfect markets are not the 
environment in which energy efficiency policies are 
proposed.”38 
III. UNDERSTANDING AND EXPLOITING THE GAP:
IMPLICATIONS FOR PRIVATE CLIMATE 
GOVERNANCE 
This is not the place to attempt to resolve the differences 
between these authors or the camps overall.  In addition, many 
of their disputes are more relevant to discussions of the 
desirability of particular types of government laws and policies 
(e.g., taxes, cap and trade systems, and efficiency standards) 
than to the efficiency gap issue that matters most for private 
climate governance:  understanding the extent to which a large 
gap exists based on corporate, household and other private 
sector investment inefficiencies, and thus whether private 
initiatives face a low hurdle in trying to drive private sector 
energy use and GHG emissions reductions.  What does the 
debate between engineers and economists suggest on this issue?  
Is there reason to be optimistic or pessimistic about whether the 
energy-efficiency gap arising from investment inefficiencies is 
large enough to enable private climate initiatives to achieve 
major near-term GHG emissions reductions?  In my view, 
several lessons can be drawn from the debate. 
38. Id. at 1.
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First, there is an urgent need to draw on the existing 
literature to identify the magnitude of the investment-
inefficiency-based component of the energy-efficiency gap.  
Economists frequently point to shortcomings in non-price-based 
approaches to the climate problem, but by now it is clear that 
governments are unlikely to adopt the first-best approach at the 
global or national level in the near term (a carbon tax).  The 
importance of reducing carbon emissions in the near term and 
the pervasive government gridlock on climate policy suggest 
that waiting for first-best solutions is not an adequate response 
to the climate problem.39  Instead, it is time to examine, develop, 
and deploy the most promising second-best responses, and 
private initiatives are an important, often-overlooked option.40  
The energy-efficiency-gap estimates included in engineering 
studies suggest that the billion-ton GHG target is not unrealistic.  
Economists’ critiques suggest that the engineering studies 
overestimate the gap, but economists have yet to develop their 
own overall estimates of the size of the gap, so it is hard to know 
whether the billion-ton target is unrealistic based on the 
economics literature.  It is time for an interdisciplinary initiative 
to resolve differences between the camps where possible, and to 
identify a range of reasonable estimates of the investment-
inefficiency-based energy-efficiency gap that accounts for the 
perspectives of engineers, economists, and other experts.  The 
literature generated by engineers and economists often assumes 
that the audience is government policymakers, rather than the 
private actors who are in a position to develop private energy or 
climate initiatives.  The range of reasonable estimates of the 
investment-inefficiency-based energy-efficiency gap is 
important, however, because it could not only inform public 
policymakers (e.g., federal, state and local government 
managers), but also private policymakers (e.g., philanthropists, 
advocacy group managers, and the managers of corporations, 
39. See Michael P. Vandenbergh & Jonathan A. Gilligan, Macro-Risks: The
Challenge for Rational Risk Regulation, 21 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 401, 402, 430-31 
(2011). 
40. David G. Victor, Taking the Lead: Faced with Government Inaction, Private
Firms Emerge as Major Players in Climate Change Mitigation, 358 SCIENCE 1547, 1547 
(2017) (reviewing VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 3); see also Richard B. Stewart 
et al., A New Strategy for Global Climate Protection, 120 CLIMATIC CHANGE 1, 1-12 
(2013). 
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colleges and universities, and religious, civic, and cultural 
organizations), about the overall priority that should be given to 
efficiency-based initiatives as well as the most promising 
specific energy-using actions to target. 
Second, it is important to gather additional data to fill 
important holes in our understanding of the investment-
inefficiency-based energy-efficiency gap.  Given the importance 
of understanding the magnitude and specific features of the gap, 
increased overall research support, and support of 
interdisciplinary research in particular, is warranted.  The 
research could include efforts to provide an interdisciplinary 
estimate of the investment-inefficiency-based gap and to 
identify priority areas for additional empirical studies, with a 
particular focus on identifying and quantifying unobserved costs 
and responses to risk. 
Third, because both the engineering and economics camps 
tend to focus on corporations and households (often referred to 
as consumers by economists), the discussion of the investment-
inefficiency-based gap misses a number of sectors that are 
important for assessing the opportunity for private climate 
governance.  For instance, religious organizations operate 
numerous buildings, have large numbers of employees, and have 
extensive supply chains, all of which contribute to carbon 
emissions.  These emissions occur at levels that are meaningful 
on a global scale:  Our back-of-the-envelope assessment of the 
Catholic Church suggests that its worldwide emissions would 
rank it among the top fifty countries in the world if it were a 
country.41  Many private hospitals, colleges and universities, and 
civic and cultural organizations also are substantial direct and 
indirect GHG emitters.  A complete analysis of the efficiency 
gap should assess the size of the gap in these sectors and any 
sector-specific barriers or opportunities. 
Fourth, it is important to understand that efficiency 
opportunities are valuable if they make efficiency investments 
less costly, even if these investments still have some cost.  To 
support private climate initiatives, efficiency-gap research thus 
should focus not only on whether inefficiencies exist that would 
make behavior change profitable, but also whether inefficiencies 
41. VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 3, at Ch. 9. 
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exist that would lower barriers to behavior change to the point 
where other drivers (reputational concerns, investor, lender or 
supply-chain pressure, employee morale, social and personal 
norms) become effective.  Many private initiatives seek to 
harness these other drivers, which may tip the balance in favor 
of action if the monetary cost is low.  For instance, a retailer 
might find that replacing incandescent bulbs with more efficient 
LED lighting reduces energy costs, but not to the point where 
the discounted savings exceed the costs of installing new bulbs.  
The lower costs might enable pressure concerning the firm’s 
environmental reputation and ability to attract and retain high-
skill employees to tip the balance, however, inducing the retailer 
to take the energy- and GHG-reducing step.  The academic and 
policy literatures do not provide a clear answer on the size of the 
energy-efficiency gap that is defined not just by investments that 
produce a net cost savings, but also those that substantially 
lower the cost of reducing carbon emissions, even if there is still 
some cost.  
The fifth and final point relates to timing:  To provide an 
important opportunity for private initiatives, the inefficiencies 
included in the energy-efficiency gap need not be inefficiencies 
that would have remained in perpetuity or over many years.  To 
contribute to climate mitigation, private initiatives need only 
accelerate the uptake of more efficient technologies and 
practices, they need not induce firms or households to exploit 
efficiencies that they would have never exploited. Some of the 
inefficiencies that are potential targets of private climate 
initiatives may well have been ferreted out and reduced through 
market incentives at some point, but for the gap to be important 
for the climate problem, private initiatives need only accelerate 
the closing of the gap.  This is true because time matters for 
climate change:  The longer we remain at elevated levels of 
GHGs in the atmosphere, the greater the chance we will cross 
thresholds that will make the problem much more expensive, if 
not impossible, to address.42  Although economists typically 
start with an assumption that markets are efficient, few would 
argue that markets are instantaneously efficient, and the gap is 
42. See, e.g., VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 3, at Ch. 2 (analogizing
exceedance of GHG atmospheric levels as operating a car in the red zone on its 
tachometer). 
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important if it identifies areas where private initiatives can 
accelerate implementation of efficiency measures that might 
otherwise have occurred at a later date. 
IV. CONCLUSION
If private governance efforts are to contribute meaningfully 
to sustainability, they should be founded on realistic 
assumptions about what motivates the targets of private 
initiatives.  Corporate and household motivations are often 
complex and unclear, but we can be fairly certain that it is easier 
to motivate behavior change if the desired action is profitable or 
can be taken at little cost.  This is particularly important for 
private governance initiatives, since the driver of change is a 
private entity that lacks the coercive power and resources of 
government.  Engineering studies suggest that a very large 
energy-efficiency gap exists that could provide opportunities for 
private governance initiatives, but studies by economists cast 
doubt on the size of the gap. Given the important role of private 
governance in responding to climate change, it is time to bridge 
the disciplinary chasm and develop a much more reliable and 
fine-grained assessment of the energy-efficiency gap. 
